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The God Who Trusts: A Relational Theology of Divine Faith, Hope, and Love, 
by Wm. Curtis Holtzen. InterVarsity Press, 2019. Pp. xv + 264. $28.00 
(paperback).
JOHANNES GRÖSSL, University of Würzburg (Germany)
In The God Who Trusts, Curtis Holtzen discusses God’s essential attributes 
from the perspective of an open and relational theology and argues for 
including trust or faith as a divine attribute. He presents his thesis right 
at the beginning: “I would like to suggest that just as holiness, love, and 
relationality are great-making qualities, so too is faith .  .  . God trusts, 
hopes, believes” (1). Holtzen defends human libertarian free will with the 
essential power to choose between alternatives. He sees such freedom as 
a requirement for a genuine loving relationship between creator and crea-
ture and for the acceptance of God’s grace (9–12). In accordance with open 
theism, he argues that human free will implies that God Himself faces an 
open future and thus is mutable and in some way in time (13–17). If God 
faces an open future, He cannot guarantee certain things to happen; there-
fore, creation involves risks.
The unquestionable strength of Holtzen’s book is a clear definition of 
terms, which is not stipulative, but rooted in ordinary-language usage. 
After giving an overview of what faith means and entails (chapter 2), the 
book is structured around particular terms that are to be attributed to God: 
love (chapter 3), belief (chapter 4), trust (chapter 5), hope (chapter 6). In 
a final chapter entitled “Divine Faith and the Advent of Christ,” Holtzen 
makes a quite novel excursus on Christology, on which I will specifically 
focus in this review.
problem seriously and see what nonconsequentialist theories might offer 
by way of solution.
It seems to me that Christian philosophers or philosophers of religion 
who are interested in religious moral theory will have much to gain from 
consideration of Fried’s book: the problems she raises are problems facing 
all of us in a modern society in which the problems of scarcity and risk 
imposition are central. It will not be open to most of us to accept aggrega-
tion full-stop as the solution to these problems, so we will need to think 
hard about how nonconsequentialism, including in Christian moral the-
ory, can address them.
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The author is aware that there is no “univocal one-size-fits-all con-
ceptualization” of terms like faith (31). He discusses propositional and 
non-propositional forms of belief and how they relate to each other (32–
37), recognizing analytic discussions by Swinburne and Howard-Snyder. 
Holtzen puts attention on faith as trust: Trust is personal, risky, and voli-
tional (38). What he calls “thick trust” furthermore has “moral implica-
tions and can rightly produce feelings of appreciation or disappointment” 
(40). The difference between belief and faith, for the author, is that faith 
is meritorious, while belief is involuntary (45). One issue in the chapter 
on faith to be disputed is the assertion that our “initial trust in God was 
most likely a willful act of reliance” (45); is it not the case that most people 
growing up in religious families have some kind of “original faith,” which 
is voluntarily accepted in hindsight or at some time rejected? A similar 
worry can be brought up regarding the author’s optimistic view that 
“hope is willful” because it is subject to moral scrutiny (49). Even liber-
tarians should recognize that a great deal of human behavior, especially 
emotional reactions to situations, is not under direct voluntary control. 
Christian tradition perceives faith, love, and hope as virtues or “inclina-
tions of the will”; this implies that we can willfully acquire or lose these 
virtues only in a very slow process—if at all. Holtzen concludes that faith 
is a relational term regarding the relationship between humans and God, 
which also involves God having faith in humans (59).
In the chapters on God’s love and God’s belief, Holtzen is refurbish-
ing arguments and motives generally defended by kenoticists and open 
theists: Genuine love is incompatible with control, love involves self-re-
straint, love entails reciprocity and vulnerability (60–68). While elabo-
rately discussing metaphors of love and faith (68–88), the author states 
that “[a]uthentic love means waiting, hoping, and trusting the other to 
freely respond” (74). When discussing the assertion that God believes cer-
tain propositions to be true or false, Holtzen shows that he has intensively 
studied the literature on the truth-value of future contingents (95–106). He 
himself favors a “non-bivalence approach” (105) combined with probabil-
istic predictions: God can believe things about future states of affairs when 
He knows that there is a high probability of these coming to pass. Later 
in the book, it is stated that God can even hope for things with a very low 
probability, although only if He knows that they are not impossible. As 
with faith, even more important is the non-propositional aspect of belief: 
believing in someone. This means, minimally, “I value what this or these 
persons can offer or become” (107). Compared to mere trust, believing in 
someone requires that “we know something about a person’s character or 
abilities” (108).
The biblical examples given for God’s belief in humans, however, may 
raise some concerns: narratives like the “binding of Isaac” are taken very 
literally by the author; he even asks whether it is possible that “God wres-
tled with the horror” of demanding Abraham to kill his son (111). Holtzen 
writes, “If God is a God of love, then such a horrific demand could only 
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be placed upon an individual that God believed had a character to likely 
rise to the occasion. God needed to know if Abraham was trustworthy, a 
person who feared God” (112). Does God really need to test someone’s 
trustworthiness? Even an open theist should be able to assert that God can 
thoroughly evaluate everyone’s character instantly. Moreover, a minor 
inconsistency in this chapter can be found when it is written that “God’s 
belief in us began at creation” (119). If God is in time (cf. in detail 168–171) 
and if believing in someone requires that one knows something about the 
character of the other person, God cannot believe in anyone already at 
creation; God’s faith and belief in us can grow or be diminished over time 
(120–127). But can God really evaluate the probability of free decisions? 
Holtzen writes that divine doubt occurs “when God knows the likelihood 
of some desired state is less than 50 percent” (121). One could argue that 
probabilities in behavior reflect the state of one’s character that is already 
fixed or at least cannot be changed instantaneously. In such cases, however, 
God does not doubt, but knows that certain changes are not going to hap-
pen within a certain time. Moreover, Holtzen’s disturbing assertion that 
God “now believes creation to be wicked and evil” (123) should be further 
explained in this context. Similarly striking is his thesis later in the book 
that “without hope God could only foresee wrath and destruction” (165).
In the chapter on trust, it is emphasized that God took a great but una-
voidable risk in creation: “If God desires cooperation, then God cannot 
exist risk free” (133). In Holtzen’s probabilistic framework, his discussion 
of a divine covenant is quite intriguing: if God perceives individuals or peo-
ples with a high probability (or a lower risk, respectively) to enter into 
a loving relationship with Him and/or foster His salvific plan, He can 
choose to enter into a covenant (cf. 145), which “rests on the premise that 
trust is a living reality for each covenant partner” (146). The author offers 
better biblical interpretations than other open theists; for example, God’s 
regretting making Saul king is interpreted as God realizing that “he could 
no longer trust Saul to rule Israel” (149). In summary, Holtzen argues that 
God aims at a relationship with His creatures which involves mutual trust; 
individuals and groups, however, must present themselves as trustworthy 
in order to be offered and enter a relationship or covenant with God. In the 
following chapter (162–190), it is clarified that a God who has faith must 
also hope, and a being who hopes must be a temporal being who succes-
sively experiences what occurs. Here, God’s being “not illogical” is high-
lighted—God does not hope for what is logically impossible (175). It is 
in need of explanation that the author contrarily asserts that Christianity 
“has never been shy about paradox, and that is good” earlier in the book 
when discussing God’s self-limitation (137) and similarly later concerning 
the cross of Christ (cf. 206). Altogether, the chapters on the divine attrib-
utes fortunately avoid paradoxical language; they are logical, well argued, 
and rich in practical and biblical examples.
Few open theists take the risk of discussing the implications of 
their model of God and their anthropology on Christological issues. In 
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chapter 7, the author draws some logical implications: If the relationship 
between God and Christ is a (perfect) relationship of faith, there must be 
mutual trust between God and Christ which necessarily involves igno-
rance and risk. The kenosis of the Logos is portrayed as an act of faith on 
God’s side (194). It is remarkable that even Mary’s and other persons’ lib-
ertarian freedom is respected in Holtzen’s view: “What kind of faith did it 
take for God to entrust Jesus to the care of a young Palestinian Jewish girl? 
What kind of faith did God display in having Jesus grow and develop in 
such an unstable time in Israel’s history?” (195). According to him, God 
could not know at the time of the incarnation whether it would succeed: 
whether “humanity would respond to [Christ’s] sacrificial death on its 
behalf” (195). On the other side, Christ’s freedom in deciding whether to 
take up the cross is emphasized: “This free will on Jesus’ part must have 
included the ability to not only succeed but possibly to fail in this sacrifi-
cial mission” (196). From an exegetical point of view, it is plausible to read 
biblical temptation narratives as “principal examples of the fuller life of 
Jesus” (200), possibly even as (what exegetes call) a prolepsis of Christ’s 
final decision in Gethsemane (cf. 201–203; 207). The author raises very 
important theological questions; however, the answers given are not thor-
oughly convincing, or at least fall short of a detailed explanation: What 
Christological and trinitarian model can explain what it means to identify 
Christ’s faith with God’s faith (197)?
When confronted with the question of whether Christ could sin, 
Holtzen seems to reject libertarianism in favor of compatibilism in agree-
ment with Thomas C. Oden—an inconsistent strategy most open theists 
adopt. Although Holtzen claims that “Jesus, like the rest of humanity, had 
the freedom to sin” (205), he does not understand freedom as the power 
to choose between opposites here: Stating that Jesus’s sinlessness was 
“inevitable but not necessary,” because Christ’s freedom is identical to the 
freedom of the eternal Son (205), is a typical Alexandrian strategy com-
bined with a compatibilist notion of God’s freedom. This identification of 
“Jesus” and the “Son” of God is underlined when Holtzen uses the terms 
interchangeably (cf. 206). But how can an impeccable person be truly 
human? Suddenly, Holtzen breaks with the compatibilist strategy and 
seemingly returns to libertarianism: “Jesus could have cursed the Father 
at any point” (207). He also rejects any supernatural power of Christ (as 
most Antiochenes defend), because it would, according to Holtzen, elimi-
nate both risk and faith, trust and trustworthiness (207).
The author’s soteriology, outlined on pages 210 to 223, is a lot more 
comprehensible: Without a human response there is no reconciliation 
(211–212)! The cross alone does not make salvation a reality; it is only a 
necessary, but not a sufficient cause. What can be disputed, however, is 
the author’s clear positioning in the theory of satisfaction: “While God 
has been wronged and is owed a great debt, God has, instead, chosen to 
forgive and justify” (212). Fortunately, by referring to the theology of open 
theist Clark Pinnock, the author rejects that God “requires sacrifice and 
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Approaching the Atonement: The Reconciling Work of Christ, by Oliver 
D. Crisp. InterVarsity Press, 2020. Pp. x + 198. $22.00 (paperback).
ALEXANDER HYUN, Minerva Schools at the Keck Graduate Institute
In this review of Oliver Crisp’s Approaching the Atonement: The Reconciling 
Work of Christ, I first provide a summary of the most important goals of each 
chapter. I will utilize more space summarizing and engaging with elements 
of Crisp’s discussion that set it apart from most other introductory books on 
the atonement. I will then explain why I believe Crisp’s book to be an excel-
lent introduction to the theology of atonement. I conclude by identifying 
some things that are absent from the book that those who are searching for 
an introduction to the atonement might have wanted to see included.
appeasement before being willing to love” (214). A striking implication 
of an open and relational theology is that God cannot guarantee salvation 
even after Jesus’s death on the cross. The author remains somewhat unspe-
cific here; I interpret the implications of his theory as such: The apostles 
could have run away for good. It was possible that no one cared about the 
gospel after Jesus’s death. The existence of the church is rooted in but not 
necessitated by the cross, not even by the resurrection (217). God could 
only hope that the cross be effective (216) and a church be established 
(218–223). These are, in my opinion, necessary consequences of open the-
ism—and necessary implications of a God who trusts—which need to be 
either acknowledged or at least actively disputed by those defending this 
model of God.
Holtzen’s book is a very important addition to previous academic 
work on open theism. He fills two rather significant gaps that had been 
overlooked or avoided by most other authors: First, it is emphasized that 
a loving, risk-taking God must be a God who believes in and trusts His 
creatures, not only the other way. Second, the implications of a libertarian 
anthropology are extended to the freedom of Christ and the freedom of his 
early followers. As a consequence, in an open theology, God could neither 
guarantee that Christ would take up the cross nor that a church would be 
established. Possibly, and here more theological research must be done, 
God could not even guarantee that the requirements for an incarnation 
and thus for salvation would be met at a certain time in history. He could 
only hope for and—maybe—increase the probability of salvation and all 
its freedom-depending requirements to occur.
